GOVERNANCE ECOLOGY IN INDONESIA: INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION AND COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC POLICY PROCESSES

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Abstract *: This study analyzes governance ecology as an analytical framework for understanding institutional adaptation and collaborative governance practices in Indonesia's public policy processes. Decentralization reforms initiated since 1999 have created a complex, multi-level governance landscape in which diverse actors, institutions, and policy arenas interact dynamically. This qualitative research employs a critical interpretive synthesis (CIS) approach, drawing on data from international and national peer-reviewed journals, government policy documents, and international organization reports. Key findings demonstrate that Indonesia's governance ecology is characterized by three interrelated dimensions: institutional fragmentation resulting from big-bang decentralization, uneven adaptive capacity across regional governments, and the emergence of collaborative forums including Musrenbang, Forest Management Units (KPH), and service delivery partnerships as adaptive responses to governance complexity. This study makes a theoretical contribution by integrating the ecology of games framework, institutional adaptation theory, and collaborative governance model within a developing country context. Practically, findings indicate that strengthening governance ecology requires not only formal structural reforms but also enhanced inter-institutional collaborative capacity and active non-governmental actor engagement in Indonesia's public policy processes.*

Keywords *: collaborative governance, governance ecology, Indonesia, institutional adaptation, public policy*

Abstrak : Kajian ini menganalisis ekologi tata kelola (*governance ecology*) sebagai kerangka analitik untuk memahami adaptasi kelembagaan dan praktik collaborative governance dalam proses kebijakan publik di Indonesia. Desentralisasi yang dimulai sejak 1999 telah menciptakan lanskap tata kelola yang kompleks, di mana berbagai aktor, institusi, dan arena kebijakan berinteraksi secara dinamis dalam struktur multi-level. Penelitian ini bersifat kualitatif dengan pendekatan *critical interpretive synthesis* (CIS), memanfaatkan sumber data dari jurnal ilmiah internasional dan nasional, dokumen kebijakan pemerintah, serta laporan organisasi internasional. Temuan utama menunjukkan ekologi tata kelola Indonesia dicirikan oleh tiga dimensi saling terkait yaitu fragmentasi kelembagaan akibat desentralisasi besar-besaran (big-bang decentralization), kapasitas adaptif lembaga pemerintah yang tidak merata antardaerah, serta munculnya forum-forum kolaboratif seperti Musrenbang, KPH, dan kemitraan layanan publik sebagai respons adaptif terhadap kompleksitas tata kelola. Kajian ini berkontribusi secara teoritis dengan mengintegrasikan *ecology of games framework*, teori institutional adaptation, dan model *collaborative governance* dalam konteks negara berkembang. Secara praktis, temuan ini menunjukkan bahwa penguatan ekologi tata kelola membutuhkan tidak hanya reformasi struktural formal, tetapi juga pembangunan kapasitas kolaboratif antarlembaga dan pelibatan aktif aktor non-pemerintah dalam proses kebijakan publik di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci : tata kelola kolaboratif, ekologi tata kelola, Indonesia, adaptasi kelembagaan, kebijakan publik

PENDAHULUAN

Indonesia's governance landscape has undergone a profound transformation since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. The subsequent decentralization reforms, initially codified through Law No. 22/1999 and subsequently revised through Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 23/2014 on Regional Government, fundamentally restructured the vertical distribution of authority between central and regional governments. Although decentralization was designed to bring governance closer to citizens, strengthen regional autonomy, and improve public service delivery, its implementation has produced a complex and multilayered governance architecture characterized by overlapping jurisdictions, contested authority, institutional fragmentation, and highly variable administrative capacities across Indonesia's provinces, districts, and municipalities (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003; Hadiz, 2010). Rather than operating through a single hierarchical structure, governance in post-decentralization Indonesia increasingly involves multiple institutions, actors, rules, and decision-making arenas that interact across different levels and sectors. This configuration can be understood through the concept of governance ecology, which views governance as a dynamic web of interdependent institutional arrangements and actors operating simultaneously across multiple scales and arenas (Lubell, 2013; Ostrom, 2010).

Understanding Indonesia's governance ecology is not merely an academic concern but has direct implications for policy effectiveness, public service delivery, and democratic accountability. The concept draws primarily on Ostrom's (1990, 2010) polycentric governance framework, which emphasizes the coexistence of multiple centers of decision-making with overlapping but relatively autonomous authority, and Lubell's (2013) ecology of games approach, which conceptualizes governance as a system of interconnected institutional arenas in which actors strategically participate in multiple games simultaneously. From this perspective, governance outcomes do not emerge from the actions of a single institution but from interactions among multiple actors operating under different rules, interests, and institutional arrangements. Such complexity also means that institutional arrangements cannot be treated as static structures. They continuously evolve through processes of adaptation in response to political, socioeconomic, and environmental pressures (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Within this governance ecology, collaborative governance emerges as both a consequence of institutional complexity and an adaptive mechanism for addressing coordination problems among interdependent actors. Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 544) define collaborative governance as governing arrangements in which public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in collective decision-making. In a fragmented governance environment such as Indonesia, collaborative arrangements may therefore provide mechanisms for coordinating actors whose authority, resources, and interests are distributed across institutional boundaries.

Institutional adaptation is particularly important in explaining the uneven consequences of decentralization in Indonesia. Although formal institutional reforms can be introduced relatively rapidly through legislation and administrative restructuring, informal institutions, political networks, patronage relationships, and established bureaucratic practices often demonstrate greater persistence (North, 1990; Hadiz, 2010). Consequently, changes in formal rules do not necessarily produce corresponding changes in governance practices. Institutional adaptation may instead occur gradually through processes such as layering, displacement, conversion, and drift (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). These mechanisms provide a useful analytical basis for understanding

how existing institutions respond to new governance demands without necessarily being completely replaced. Indonesia's post-decentralization experience illustrates this tension particularly clearly, as newly established regional institutions have had to operate within institutional legacies inherited from a highly centralized political and bureaucratic system. Path dependency further explains why earlier institutional choices may continue to constrain subsequent reform trajectories and produce uneven institutional capacities across regions (Pierson, 2004).

The interaction between governance ecology, institutional adaptation, and collaborative governance is therefore central to understanding how governance systems respond to complexity. In a polycentric environment, actors must navigate multiple institutional arenas, negotiate competing interests, and adjust existing rules and practices to accommodate changing circumstances. However, the emergence of collaboration does not automatically guarantee inclusive or equitable governance. Differences in political resources, institutional capacity, information, and bargaining power can shape who participates, whose interests are represented, and whose preferences ultimately influence policy outcomes. Collaborative governance may consequently function as a mechanism for collective problem-solving while simultaneously reproducing existing power asymmetries. This concern is particularly relevant in Indonesia, where decentralization has created new opportunities for local participation but has also provided opportunities for political and economic elites to appropriate institutional arrangements and influence policy processes (Hadiz, 2010).

Despite a substantial body of research on Indonesian decentralization, institutional reform, and collaborative governance, the dynamic relationship among these dimensions remains insufficiently theorized. Existing scholarship has frequently examined vertical intergovernmental relations, decentralization outcomes, or collaborative governance through sector-specific and case-based studies, while comparatively less attention has been given to how multiple institutional arrangements interact within a broader governance ecology. Three research gaps are particularly important. First, although governance ecology perspectives have gained increasing attention in studies of natural resource management, environmental governance, and complex policy systems, their application to developing-country governance contexts, particularly Indonesia, remains comparatively limited. Second, research on collaborative governance in Indonesia has often been descriptive and case-specific, with insufficient integration into broader theories of institutional adaptation and institutional change. Third, the causal and dynamic relationships among governance ecology, institutional adaptation, and collaborative governance outcomes have yet to be systematically theorized in the Indonesian context.

This study addresses these gaps by positioning governance ecology as an integrative analytical lens for examining the interaction between institutional complexity, institutional adaptation, and collaborative governance in post-decentralization Indonesia. It specifically aims to map the structural characteristics of Indonesia's governance ecology, identify the mechanisms through which institutions adapt within this complex environment, and examine how collaborative governance practices emerge and function amid overlapping authorities, institutional interdependence, and unequal capacities. By bringing together insights from polycentric governance, ecology of games, institutional change, and collaborative governance perspectives, this study seeks to develop a more comprehensive explanation of governance transformation in Indonesia. The study argues that collaborative governance should not be understood merely as a managerial response to fragmented authority, but as an adaptive institutional process embedded within a broader governance ecology in which formal rules, informal institutions, actor strategies,

and power relations continuously interact. This perspective provides a basis for understanding why similar decentralization and collaborative governance arrangements may produce different outcomes across institutional and regional contexts and contributes to broader theoretical discussions on governance adaptation and complexity in developing countries.

METODE PENELITIAN

This research employs a qualitative methodology, specifically the Critical Interpretive Synthesis (CIS) approach developed by Dixon-Woods et al. (2006). Unlike systematic reviews that primarily aggregate empirical findings, CIS seeks to generate new theoretical interpretations by critically engaging with the assumptions, concepts, and arguments embedded in existing bodies of literature. This approach is particularly appropriate for this study's objectives because it facilitates integration across multiple theoretical traditions governance ecology, institutional adaptation, and collaborative governance while remaining sensitive to the contextual specificities of the Indonesian case and its evolving governance dynamics.

Data sources were drawn from four categories: peer-reviewed articles from international and national journals indexed in Scopus, Web of Science, and SINTA (Indonesia's national science and technology indexing system); academic books and edited volumes in governance, institutional theory, and public policy; government policy documents, including successive National Medium-Term Development Plans (RPJMN 2005–2024), decentralization legislation, and related government regulations; and reports from international organizations, including the World Bank, UNDP, and the Asian Development Bank, on Indonesian governance and decentralization, as well as relevant institutional reports.

The literature search employed combinations of key terms, including 'governance ecology,' 'institutional adaptation,' 'collaborative governance,' 'Indonesia,' 'decentralization,' 'Musrenbang,' 'polycentric governance,' and 'public policy.' Studies published between 2000 and 2024 were prioritized, though seminal works from earlier periods were included where their theoretical relevance was demonstrated across diverse disciplinary and policy contexts. A total of 87 sources were initially identified, of which 42 were selected for in-depth analysis based on relevance, theoretical contribution, and methodological quality.

Data analysis followed a thematic analysis procedure (Braun & Clarke, 2006) in which recurring themes, concepts, and arguments were systematically coded, categorized, and interpreted through constant comparison. The analytical process focused specifically on: (1) identifying structural features of Indonesia's governance ecology; (2) tracing mechanisms of institutional adaptation; and (3) mapping the conditions and outcomes of collaborative governance practices. Interpretive coherence was maintained through iterative cross-referencing between emerging themes and individual source materials.


HASIL DAN PEMBAHASAN

The Structural Ecology of Governance in Post-Decentralization Indonesia

Indonesia's post-decentralization governance ecology is characterized by a distinctive multilevel structural configuration: a formal hierarchy of governmental actors (central, provincial, district/city, and village levels) intersected by a dense network of non-governmental and quasi-governmental bodies including State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN/BUMD), civil society organizations, international development partners, and customary institutions. This configuration, visualized in Figure 1, creates what Lubell (2013) identifies as multiple overlapping governance

games, each with distinct actors, rules, stakes, and payoff structures that collectively shape policy outcomes at every level.

Figure 1. Multi-Level Governance Ecology in Post-Decentralization Indonesia



Source: Developed by the author, adapted from Ostrom (2010) and Lubell (2013)

At the national level, coordination challenges arise from the fragmentation of sectoral authority across more than 34 ministries and agencies, each operating independent implementation networks extending to regional governments. Bappenas (National Development Planning Agency) serves nominally as a coordination hub through the National Development Planning System (SPPN), but its authority is constrained by the legal autonomy of line ministries and regional governments (Smoke, 2014). This creates what Termeer, Dewulf, and Van Lieshout (2010) term governance fragmentation a condition in which multiple governance arrangements operate in parallel without sufficient mechanisms for coordination or mutual adjustment. The consequence is a governance ecology characterized by institutional redundancy in some domains and institutional voids in others.

At the regional level, the big-bang decentralization of 1999–2001 transferred significant functional responsibilities to over 500 districts and municipalities with highly variable institutional capacities. While some regions notably Yogyakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya developed relatively strong governance institutions, others face persistent capacity deficits in financial management, human resources, and technical expertise (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003). This uneven institutional landscape creates adaptive capacity gaps: some governance actors can respond effectively to complex policy challenges while others remain locked in institutional inertia. The World Bank (2021) documented that this capacity variation is not merely a resource problem but reflects deeper differences in local political economies, civil society strength, and leadership quality factors that constitute critical dimensions of the governance ecology.

Table 1. Mechanisms of Institutional Adaptation in Indonesian Governance

Mechanism	Key Characteristics	Indonesian Example	Policy Domain	Outcome
Layering	New rules added on top of existing	Village Fund Law (No. 6/2014) layered onto	Fiscal decentralization /	New governance arenas at

Mechanism	Key Characteristics	Indonesian Example	Policy Domain	Outcome
	structures without replacing them	district governance structures	village governance	village level; increased resource flows; planning complexity
Conversion	Existing institutions redirected to new purposes by reform actors	Musrenbang transformed from pro-forma to genuine multi-stakeholder planning forum (in reform-minded regions)	Development planning / participatory governance	Improved priority alignment in high-capacity regions; persistent formalism elsewhere
Displacement	Existing rules partially replaced through political contestation	Replacement of Law No. 32/2004 with Law No. 23/2014, recentralizing some regional functions	Intergovernmental relations	Partial recentralization of authority; reduced regional autonomy in key functional areas
Drift	Institutional erosion as context changes without formal rule revision	Central supervisory function over regional governments weakened through capacity constraints and political considerations	Intergovernmental oversight	Reduced accountability; heterogeneous governance quality; increased risk of elite capture

Source: Compiled from Mahoney & Thelen (2010); Hadiz (2010); World Bank (2021); Bappenas (2019)

Mechanisms of Institutional Adaptation in Indonesian Governance

Table 1 synthesizes the four mechanisms of institutional adaptation identified by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) as they manifest in Indonesia's governance context. The most pervasive mechanism is layering, exemplified most clearly by the introduction of the Village Fund (Dana Desa) program under Law No. 6/2014. Rather than restructuring the relationship between district governments and villages, this law created a new layer of village authority, planning, and financial management coexisting alongside existing district governance arrangements. Village fund

disbursements reached IDR 72 trillion in 2022 (Ministry of Finance, 2023), generating new governance dynamics at the village level that require institutional capacities for participatory planning, transparent financial management, and accountability to village communities capacities that many villages are still building.


Conversion is equally visible in the transformation of Musrenbang forums. Originally designed as top-down consultation mechanisms that legitimized centrally determined plans, Musrenbang processes in better-performing regions have been progressively redirected toward genuine bottom-up priority setting and inter-agency coordination (Innes & Booher, 2010). In Surabaya, for instance, urban neighborhood (RT/RW) deliberations genuinely feed into district-level budget planning, creating a functioning collaborative planning ecology that approximates Ansell and Gash's (2008) conditions for effective collaborative governance. However, as Bappenas (2019) acknowledged, this level of conversion is exceptional; in most regions, Musrenbang retains largely ceremonial characteristics a classic example of Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) layering-without-genuine-conversion.

Institutional drift has occurred in several critical governance dimensions. The constitutional mandate for central government supervision of regional governance quality has drifted toward ineffectiveness: while Law No. 23/2014 formally assigns supervisory functions to central ministries, administrative capacity constraints, political sensitivities around regional autonomy, and the sheer scale of governance (over 500 regions to supervise) have limited substantive oversight (Hadiz, 2010). This supervisory drift has direct consequences for governance ecology: regional variations in governance quality and hence in the conditions available for collaborative governance have widened, producing a governance ecology of increasing internal differentiation across regions and sectors.

Collaborative Governance in Indonesia's Policy Processes

Collaborative governance in Indonesia manifests across three institutional domains: development planning through Musrenbang, natural resource co-management, and public service delivery partnerships. Figure 2 presents an adaptation of Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh's (2012) integrative framework to the Indonesian context, illustrating how collaborative governance dynamics operate within and are shaped by Indonesia's system context.

Figure 2. Collaborative Governance Dynamics in Indonesia



Source: Developed by the author, adapted from Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh (2012)

The Musrenbang system constitutes Indonesia's most institutionalized form of collaborative governance. Operating annually across five levels, from village to national, it formally creates

spaces for multi-stakeholder deliberation on development priorities (Bappenas, 2019). Evaluated against Ansell and Gash's (2008) model, Musrenbang's performance is mixed. Regarding starting conditions, structural power asymmetries between government officials and civil society participants remain significant; government actors determine both the agenda and the decision criteria, limiting the degree to which non-state participants can meaningfully shape outcomes. Regarding process design, the time-bound, sequentially structured format of Musrenbang meetings constrains genuine deliberation and often produces what Aspinall and Fealy (2003) describe as ritualistic participation, presence without influence. This pattern aligns with Jessop's (1998) warning about governance failure through coordination without genuine collaboration in many regions and policy sectors across Indonesia.

Natural resource governance offers a contrasting and more promising picture of collaborative governance in practice. Community forestry (Hutan Kemasyarakatan), watershed management, and coastal fishery co-management initiatives have created multi-stakeholder governance platforms integrating government agencies, local communities, NGOs, and, in some cases, private sector actors (Berkes, 2009). The Forest Management Units (KPH) framework introduced by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry institutionalizes collaborative governance at the forest management unit level, creating polycentric governance arrangements that Ostrom (1990) would recognize as consistent with effective commons management. The KPH framework's effectiveness, however, varies substantially across regions, reflecting once again the centrality of local governance ecology conditions, particularly the presence of active civil society organizations and sufficient government capacity for collaborative governance outcomes, for sustainable and inclusive resource management.

Table 2. Comparative Overview of Collaborative Governance Initiatives in Indonesia

Initiative	Level	Key Actors	Key Challenges	Outcomes	Assessment
Musrenbang	Village–National	Government (all levels), Civil society, Community representatives	Power asymmetry; ritualistic participation; limited agenda control by non-state actors	Budget priority alignment; development planning coordination; variable deliberative quality	Mixed high variation across regions
Dana Desa Planning (BPD)	Village	Village gov., Village Council (BPD), Community groups, Facilitators	Capacity deficits; elite capture risk; accountability gaps in financial management	Community infrastructure planning; local accountability mechanisms; new governance arenas	Promising with capacity support


Initiative	Level	Key Actors	Key Challenges	Outcomes	Assessment
KPH / Community Forestry	District–National	MoEF, District gov., Local communities, NGOs, Private sector	Inter-agency coordination; land tenure conflicts; monitoring capacity	Resource sustainability improvements; livelihood co-benefits; polycentric governance development	Positive in reform regions
Service Delivery PPP	District–City	Local government, Private sector, Community organizations	Asymmetric bargaining power; contract management; public interest protection	Service coverage expansion; efficiency gains; contested accountability arrangements	Context-dependent

Source: Compiled from Ansell & Gash (2008); Emerson et al. (2012); Bappenas (2019); World Bank (2021); Berkes (2009)

Interconnections: Governance Ecology, Institutional Adaptation, and Collaborative Governance

The most significant theoretical contribution of this analysis is the identification of recursive relationships among governance ecology, institutional adaptation, and collaborative governance, visualized in Figure 3. Rather than operating as independent analytical variables, these three dimensions form a dynamic, mutually constitutive system in which each shapes and is shaped by the others through feedback loops and co-evolutionary processes. Changes in one dimension frequently generate consequences for the others, creating patterns of adaptation that evolve over time rather than through linear or isolated institutional reforms across multiple governance arenas. As governance actors respond to emerging challenges, institutional arrangements are modified, generating new opportunities and constraints for collaborative action. In turn, collaborative governance practices can influence future institutional developments and reshape the broader governance environment. This perspective highlights the importance of understanding governance not as a collection of separate structures and actors, but as an interconnected system in which institutional arrangements, collaborative practices, and governance environments continuously interact, adapt, and evolve over time.

Figure 3. Dynamic Interrelationship Model: Governance Ecology, Institutional Adaptation, and Collaborative Governance in Indonesia



Source: Developed by the author

First, governance ecology shapes the conditions for institutional adaptation. In regions where governance ecology is characterized by a dense, diversified actor network active civil society organizations, capable local academic institutions, reform-oriented government officials, and engaged international development partners institutional adaptation tends to be more rapid and substantive. The presence of diverse actors creates competitive pressure on governance institutions to adapt, provides informational resources for adaptive learning, and generates political constituencies for reform (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013). Conversely, in regions where governance ecology is dominated by a narrow set of actors with concentrated political and economic interests, institutional change tends toward superficial formal compliance while preserving underlying power structures. This corresponds to what Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identify as the conditions most likely to produce layering-without-conversion: formal reform adoption without genuine behavioral change.

Second, institutional adaptation creates new arenas for collaborative governance. The introduction of the Village Fund program under Law No. 6/2014 illustrates this dynamic: by creating new financial resources and mandatory planning requirements at the village level, the law effectively generated new governance arenas requiring participatory deliberation through Village Deliberative Assemblies (BPD). These new arenas expanded the governance ecology by introducing new actors with new stakes in governance outcomes village heads, village councils, village fund facilitators, and community beneficiaries. This exemplifies the adaptive governance feedback loops described by Folke, Hahn, Olsson, and Norberg (2005): institutional change generates new governance ecology elements, which in turn create new pressures for further institutional adaptation in an ongoing co-evolutionary dynamic.

Third, collaborative governance practices influence institutional adaptation pathways. Where collaborative governance forums have developed high levels of inter-stakeholder trust, shared understanding of policy problems, and demonstrated joint problem-solving capacity, they have become platforms for institutionalizing adaptive governance innovations. Regional case evidence from Surabaya shows how multi-stakeholder deliberation on spatial planning has been translated into formal regulatory frameworks a clear instance of conversion: collaborative practices redesigning formal institutional rules. In Central Java watershed management, community-based monitoring practices developed through collaborative governance have been incorporated into district environmental agency protocols, institutionalizing a new practice within existing structures through a process of layering that strengthens rather than merely formally complies with governance mandates.

These recursive dynamics suggest that governance reform in Indonesia cannot be treated as a one-way process of designing better institutions. Instead, reform must attend to the systemic properties of the governance ecology within which institutions operate. Kooiman's (2003) concept of societal governance governance as the pattern of interaction among self-organizing actors rather than as the product of formal design captures this insight. Effective governance ecology management in Indonesia requires simultaneously cultivating the actor diversity, inter-institutional trust, and collaborative capacity that generate adaptive institutional change from within the governance ecology, rather than relying exclusively on top-down legal reform.

Comparative Insights and Theoretical Contribution

Comparing Indonesia's governance ecology with other decentralized developing country cases reveals both shared patterns and distinctive particularities. Like India's panchayati raj and the Philippines' local governance system, Indonesia's decentralization has generated collaborative governance innovations at the subnational level while producing persistent coordination failures at the systemic level (Hutchcroft, 2001). The common pattern across these cases confirms Ostrom's (2010) insight that polycentric governance tends to be most effective at local scales while requiring stronger coordination mechanisms at higher administrative scales an insight with direct implications for Indonesia's ongoing governance reform agenda.

What distinguishes Indonesia's governance ecology is the particular configuration of formal institutional reforms intersecting with persistent informal governance arrangements rooted in local cultures, patronage networks, and customary authorities. The indigenous principle of musyawarah-mufakat (deliberation toward consensus) constitutes an informal institutional resource that collaborative governance frameworks can productively mobilize. Yet, it also potentially limits the scope for adversarial accountability and genuine disagreement that Ansell (2011) identifies as essential to adaptive governance in pluralistic settings. Navigating this tension between culturally legitimate consensus norms and democratically necessary conflict and deliberation represents one of the central challenges for collaborative governance development in Indonesia within diverse regional and institutional contexts.

From a theoretical standpoint, this analysis demonstrates that governance ecology, institutional adaptation, and collaborative governance are not adequately understood as discrete analytical domains. Their integration within a single analytical framework generates insights unavailable to any single theoretical lens alone. The ecology of games framework reveals the structural conditions enabling or constraining institutional adaptation, institutional adaptation theory explains the mechanisms through which governance arrangements evolve, and collaborative governance theory identifies the process conditions through which multi-actor coordination generates policy outcomes. Their integration produces a richer, more realistic account of governance in complex developing country contexts and beyond.

KESIMPULAN DAN SARAN

This study analyzed governance ecology as an integrative framework for understanding institutional adaptation and collaborative governance in Indonesia's post-decentralization public policy processes. Three principal findings emerge. First, Indonesia's governance ecology is characterized by layered institutional complexity, structural fragmentation, and significant regional variation in adaptive capacity. The big-bang decentralization created a governance landscape rich in actor diversity but poor in coordination mechanisms, generating an ecology simultaneously prone to institutional innovation and institutional inertia depending on local conditions across different sectors, regions, and institutional environments over time.

Institutional adaptation in Indonesia proceeds through all four mechanisms identified by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) layering, conversion, displacement, and drift with outcomes that are deeply conditioned by local governance ecology configurations. Path dependency, informal institutional persistence, and capacity asymmetries explain why formal governance reforms consistently produce highly variable outcomes across Indonesia's diverse regional governance landscapes. Governance ecology analysis directs analytical attention toward these systemic conditioning factors, explaining variance that institution-focused analyses miss.

Collaborative governance in Indonesia emerges as an adaptive institutional response to governance complexity, with genuine collaborative outcomes achievable under conditions of strong civil society presence, reform-oriented local leadership, and inclusive forum design. The recursive relationships among governance ecology, institutional adaptation, and collaborative governance constitute a dynamic governance system in which reform in any one dimension creates conditions for change in the others. This systemic insight represents the central theoretical contribution of this research across multiple levels of governance practice.

Future research should investigate these dynamics through longitudinal comparative case studies that trace how specific governance ecology configurations produce different institutional adaptation trajectories and collaborative governance outcomes over time. Practically, this analysis suggests that governance reform strategies in Indonesia should attend not only to formal institutional design but to the actor diversity, trust infrastructure, and collaborative capacity that constitute the governance ecology within which formal institutions operate and from which substantive governance change ultimately derives effectively.

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